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1.1 Motivation and Main Results
Numerous activities by an individual can have an eﬀect on the well-being of several other
individuals although possibly only one individual determines the extent of the activity and
the way in which the activity is undertaken. For instance, vehicle drivers determine the care
taken while driving and the number of miles driven, while others may be aﬀected by becoming
the victim in a possible accident with the driver. Liability rules are an instrument to reﬂect
this interdependence between the potential injurer and the potential victim in the individual
calculus of parties with an eﬀect on the outcome. A wide range of literature discusses the merits
of liability rules. Indeed, it has been established that diﬀerent liability rules induce eﬃcient
care choices in the standard accident model (e.g., Shavell 1987). Consequently, liability law
is a method that eﬀectively allows for the internalization of the interdependence between the
potential injurer and the potential victim, at least under certain circumstances.
Realistically, accident contexts are characterized by more complexity than what is captured
by the standard accident model. For example, in many accident situations, there is not only one
potential injurer or only one potential victim to the accident. This fact may introduce further
interdepencies which need to be taken into account, in one way or another, by parties with an
eﬀect on the outcome, in order to achieve eﬃciency. The context with multiple tortfeasors and
one victim has received some attention in the literature.1 Liability rules can induce the eﬃcient
care choices in this more complex setting. In contrast, the complementary case in which there
are multiple potential victims and only one potential injurer has obtained scant attention. The
following analysis sets out to remedy this.
This paper analyzes the case in which the care-taking by one potential victim aﬀects other
potential victims. Consequently, victim interdependency in the accident setting is at the core of
this work. In our setup, victim care has an eﬀect on both the accident probability of the victim
taking care, and the accident probability of other victims. Two diﬀerent scenarios need to be
distinguished. Beside the standard case with no interdependence, it is principally possible that
additional care-taking by one victim decreases or increases the accident probability of other
1Two recent contributions concerning multiple tortfeasors are Jain and Kundu (2006) and Young et al.
(2007). Further important analyses in this respect include Landes and Posner (1980), Kornhauser and Revesz
(1989), and Miceli and Segerson (1991).
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study comprises both possible manifestations of the interdependence between victims. Despite
this inclusive approach, our interest resides in particular with the case in which victims aﬀect
each other adversely. Care implies positive consequences for the victim taking care - a decrease
in expected harm - and, simultaneously, negative consequences for other victims - an increase in
expected harm. There are in all likelihood more settings in which the interdependence among
victims is best described in this way.
Let us brieﬂy outline the interdependency we focus on in particular: the case of victims
aﬀecting each other adversely. We will state three examples. First, consider a residential
neighborhood in which one individual keeps doves. The other residents are disadvantaged by
these doves due to noise and feces. Now, suppose that neighbor A of the dove-keeper applies
coloring to his property, the drastic nature of which deters doves. This does not ameliorate
the domesticized doves’ need to pass through the residential area. Consequently, individual
A’s care-taking implies that other neighbors are aﬀected to an increased extent by the doves.
Doves avoid individual A’s property but still pass through the neighborhood, where the dove-
related drawbacks are concentrated on fewer properties. To that extent, care by individual
A has decreased the expected harm of individual A but increased the expected harm of other
neighbors. Second, the context we intend to analyze can also be motivated by a traﬃc example.2
There are studies which establish that car drivers decrease their expected harm resulting from
traﬃc accidents by having their lights running during daytime (e.g. Elvik et al. 2003). This
results as road users can better and earlier detect, recognize and identify vehicles. However,
it is argued by some that this may come at the cost of a greater exposure of motorcyclists.
If formerly only motorcyclists used their lights during daylight, then the simultaneous use of
daytime running light by cars can put motorcyclists at a disadvantage.3 Consequently, the
increase in care-taking by one potential victim, the car driver who uses light during daytime,
reduces his expected harm, but simultaneously may increase the expected harm of another
potential victim, the motorcyclist. Finally, consider an example from an environmental context.
Assume that there is an oil spill close to the coast. If one of the potentially aﬀected areas has
2Traﬃc accidents are important not only because they are often cited as an example but also because of
their empirical signiﬁcance (Shavell 2007, 153).
3There is a public consultation ongoing in the European Union, which tries to distill the size of advantages
and disadvantages of mandating daytime running lights. For instance, the Federation of European Motorcyclists
Associations highlights the possibility of adverse eﬀects for motorcyclists (FEMA 2006).
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from the oil spill to other regions. Once again, the care-taking by one party exposed to the
harm potential increases the expected harm of other parties exposed to the harm potential.
Note that, under diﬀerent circumstances, this setting can represent an example for victims
aﬀecting each other positively. If the protection system keeps the oil in check for a suﬃcient
amount of time so that it starts to sink, the expected harm of other regions might decrease
as a consequence of the care-taking by this region. In summary, there are numerous practical
settings in which victim interdependence is a central feature of the context.
The consideration of victim interdependence yields strong conclusions with regards to the
performance of standard liability rules. In particular, we show that one of the liability rules
considered is uniquely equipped to deal with the additional complication of victim interdepen-
dence. This outstanding rule is strict liability with a defense of contributory negligence. In the
case in which victims aﬀect each other adversely when taking care, strict liability with a defense
of contributory negligence cuts oﬀ victim care incentives once standard care is attained. This
proves to be the central feature in this context. Given that victims take due care, the injurer
is the residual risk bearer and chooses the eﬃcient level of care as all eﬀects at the margin
are taken into account. In the case in which victims aﬀect each other positively by decreasing
each others’ accident probabilities when increasing care, strict liability with a defense of con-
tributory negligence is uniquely positioned to incentivize the taking of socially optimal care.
Socially optimal care is individually perceived as too high due to the fact that the individual
neglects the interdependence when choosing care. Strict liability with a defense of contributory
negligence performs well because the expected harm burden is reliably shifted to the injurer as
even standard injurer care cannot change this allocation given due victim care.
1.2 Relation to the Literature
In our setup, one injurer may impose harm on several victims. Such a context has not obtained
much study yet. Jain (forthcoming) studies situations characterized by one injurer and multiple
victims. However, the study mainly focuses on the case in which victims are independent. For
that case, conclusions principally follow the standard model with only one injurer and one
victim. In the section allowing for victim interdependence, Jain considers only the case in
which victims aﬀect each other positively and only provides the result that there is no standard
liability rule which ensures the eﬃcient outcome. This result re-emerges in Section 3.2, in
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that strict liability with a defense of contributory negligence is uniquely positioned to induce
the eﬃcient equilibrium. The fact that victims might have the capacity to divert the accident
potential is to our knowledge nouveau to the literature.
Besides, there are three diﬀerent points of contact to the literature other than that to the
literature on the setting of multiple tortfeasors mentioned above. First, we can refer to the
diversion topic in the literature on the economics of crime (see, e.g., Shavell 1991, Hui-Wen and
Png 1994, and Hylton 1996). There, the taking of private precautions by one potential victim
to theft lowers the attractiveness of this speciﬁc theft opportunity, i.e., the house of the victim
taking the precaution. This may divert thieves to neighbours’ houses as theft opportunities
which are relatively more attractive after the change in private precaution. In our tort setting,
these eﬀects can re-emerge. The former eﬀect takes shape in the reduction of the accident
probability of the potential victim taking the precaution, whereas the latter eﬀect manifests in
the increase of the accident probability of other potential victims. Second, there is an analysis
by Dharmapala and Hoﬀmann (2005) in which there also is an interdependence in addition to
the traditional one being that between the potential injurer and the potential victim resulting
from the potential imposition of harm. In contrast to our setting, the nouveau interdependence
introduced by the authors also relates the single potential injurer to the single potential victim.
They extend the standard accident model by interdependent costs of precaution. Thus, in their
model, the precaution costs of the injurer are aﬀected by the magnitude of precaution taken
by the victim and vice versa. This introduces a cost externality which cannot adequately be
internalized by standard liability rules in the unilateral-harm setting. The ﬁnal link of our
paper to the existent literature regards Finsinger (1991). He considers the introduction of new
activities as a consequence of which the appropriate care expected from potential victims under
the liability rule strict liability with a defense of contributory negligence changes. For instance,
the introduction of a new technology may demand higher victim care, so that standard-adherent
behavior becomes more expensive for victims as a consequence of the technology introduction.
It is shown that the missing internalization of this precaution cost change distorts the decision
of whether to introduce a new activity, relative to the social optimum.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we present the model. In
Section 3, we lay out the analysis for the liability rules considered in detail. The central results
are presented for the case in which victims aﬀect each other adversely ﬁrst, whereas results for
the complementary case follow. Concluding remarks end this study.
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We consider risk-neutral individuals of type X, Y, and Z. In the event of an accident, X will turn
out as the injurer, whereas Y or (and) Z is (are) harmed as victim(s).4 For simplicity, we consider
homogeneous victims. This allows us to expect outcomes which are symmetric in victim care,
which makes the analysis more straightforward. Both the care level and precaution costs are
denoted by the respective lower case letter, x, y, and z. Precaution by X and J lower the accident
probability of the potential injurer X with potential victim J, which is denoted by πXJ, J = Y,Z.
As is standard, we assume that individuals simultaneously choose care. The magnitude of harm
in the event of an accident is exogenous at the level D, which is the same for both victims.
The accident probability function is assumed to be πXJ = p(x)qJ(j,i), i, j = y,z, j  = i, where
px,qJ
j < 0 and pxx,qJ
jj > 0, as usual.5 To ensure that interior solutions are obtained for all care
variables, we make the following assumptions: (i) limx→0px(x) = limj→0qJ
j (j,i) = −∞ for any
level of i. (ii) |limi→0qJ
i (j,i)| < ∞ for any level of j. Finally, we assume that the diminishing
productivity of care eﬀects that qJ
j (j,i) = 0 for any i given a j suﬃciently large, and likewise
px(x) = 0 for x suﬃciently large. This reasonable assumption ensures the existence of a Nash
equilibrium below.
We choose to set up the model in a way that is most immediately interpretable as one of
exclusive harm, i.e., harm is either suﬀered by Y or Z. The examples provided in the introduction
are predominantly of this kind. However, another interpretation is possible as we can give the
following meaning to the probability functions. The function p denotes the probability that a
dangerous condition occurs, which is a precondition for an accident. The function qY denotes
the probability that an accident with individual Y results, given that a dangerous condition
has occurred. Finally, the function qZ gives the probability that individual Z will suﬀer losses,
given that Y suﬀers harm, i.e., the probability of Z suﬀering harm is contingent on there being
an accident involving X and Y.
Our central interest is the consideration of an interdependency among victims. In fact,
our model is, except for the added victim interdependency, rather standard. We intentionally
abstract from further complications such as litigation costs or uncertainty over due care, in
4We concentrate on the simplest structure which displays the central features of our interest. However, the
qualitative results are transferable to more general environments.
5The analysis can alternatively be presented using expected harm functions hXJ(x,j,i) without consequence
for the conclusions.
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following way. Given that there is a threat of an accident occurring, the increase of care by
one potential victim tends to change the exposure of the other victim. The interdependence
shows in qJ
i  = 0, where the sign may be positive or negative.6 The case in which victims aﬀect
each other positively (adversely) is described by the derivative being negative (positive) as this
depicts the fact that the increase in care by victim I decreases (increases) the accident exposure
of victim J.
It is assumed, as usual, that the social objective can be described by the minimization of
total social costs associated with the accident potential, i.e. the sum of precaution costs and
expected harm. Consequently, the policy maker minimizes
SC = x + y + z + p(x)[q
Y (y,z)D + q
Z(z,y)D] (1)




























∗)D] = 0 (4)
The level of the social cost function evaluated at (x∗,y∗,z∗) is SC∗.
We assume that the second-order conditions for (x∗,y∗,z∗) being a minimum are fulﬁlled.
The ﬁrst-order conditions reﬂect the incorporation of the victim interdependence by the policy
maker. For instance, if qJ
i < 0 holds, the policy maker would like to implement a larger i in
relation to a setting where this eﬀect is missing, all else left unchanged. This is intuitive. If the
additional unit of care achieves a larger reduction in total expected harm with marginal costs
being constant, this care is optimally chosen somewhat larger.
Individuals pursue the minimization of individual costs, which comprise precaution costs
and expected liability. The latter depends on the liability rule. Earlier literature (e.g, Shavell
1987) has shown that for liability rules to induce eﬃcient care in bilateral-care settings, they
6Concerning our function qJ, one way to make the problem more concrete for the exclusive harm case
is as follows. Suppose that qY (y,z) and qZ(z,y) = K(y,z) − qY (y,z) represent probability functions, with
0 < qY < K ≤ 1. Per assumption, it always holds that qZ
z = Kz − qY
z < 0 and qY
y = Ky − qZ
y < 0. This is
compatible with qJ
i being larger or smaller than zero.
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with a defense of contributory negligence, as well as negligence with a defense of contributory
negligence, and assume throughout the analysis that due care standards are equal to the eﬃcient
care level. We do not explicitly deal with comparative negligence in our analysis but comment
on it in the conclusion.
3 The Analysis
Liability rules perform superbly regarding the inducement of optimal care in the standard
accident model. The following analysis considers an important additional complexity which
has been neglected in the literature so far. We will now embark upon our analysis of the
performance of diﬀerent standard liability rules when there is victim interdependence. There are
two cases which need to be distinguished, the one in which victims aﬀect each other positively,
and the one in which victims aﬀect each other adversely. The latter scenario is particularly
interesting as there are presumably more settings in which the interdependence among victims
is best described as accident diversion. Consequently, we will treat the case that victim care
can increase the accident probability of other victims extensively in the following (qJ
i > 0),
whereas the other case is brieﬂy analyzed subsequently (qJ
i < 0).
3.1 Victims Aﬀect Each Other Adversely
Simple Negligence (SN)
Under simple negligence, the injurer is obliged to compensate the victim if injurer care fails to






x + p(x)[qY (y,z)D + qZ(z,y)D] if x < x∗
x if x ≥ x∗
(5)





j if x < x∗
j + p(x)qJ(j,i)D if x ≥ x∗
(6)
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from a social stance. It is now of central interest whether this behavior can be decentralized
by the use of simple negligence. Thus, we will now test whether simple negligence induces this
care vector as an equilibrium.
Suppose that victims behave in accordance with the social optimum by choosing y∗ and z∗.
In that case, injurers choose x∗ since it not only minimizes the ﬁrst line of (5), which can be
seen from returning to (2), but also allows to become free of expected harm. Thus, to obtain
the eﬃcient care vector as equilibrium, victims need to ﬁnd it optimal to respond to x∗ with
eﬃcient care.
Assume accordingly that the injurer chooses x∗. In that case, victim type J minimizes the
second line in (6) for a given i and x = x∗ and would therefore like to choose ˆ j as a best




j (ˆ j,i)D = 0 (7)
Importantly, note that ˆ j > j∗ if i = i∗ holds. This deviation from the social optimum occurs
because victims do not internalize the eﬀect their care entails on the expected harm of other
victims. A negative externality results. Given a certain level of injurer care, care by potential









If care by potential victim Y and potential victim Z are strategic substitutes (complements),
any increase in care by Y provokes a reduction (an increase) in care by Z. In graphical terms,
best response functions have a negative (positive) slope if care levels are strategic substitutes
(complements). It depends upon the cross partial qJ
ji whether care by respective victims are
strategic substitutes or complements. The interpretation is that the marginal beneﬁt of care
for J is increasing (decreasing) in i if qJ
ji < (>)0, while the marginal costs of care are unaﬀected.
Figure 1 depicts the case of complementary victim care and shows that for x = x∗ any
equilibrium in victim care will be such that both victims choose supraoptimal care.7 For this
assertion, we combine that ˆ j(i∗) > j∗, that ˆ j(0) is larger than zero, and that best response
functions are positively sloped. The ﬁgure also contains a stylized isocost-line for both victims,




j (j,i)D, which is positive (negative) as long as care is less
(larger) than the individually optimal response for the respective i.
7The ﬁgures use linear best response functions for illustrative purposes only. The set of assumptions set out
in Section 2 allows for other curvatures as well.
9
9 Friehe: Victim Interdependence in the Accident Setting










Figure 1: Best response functions if victim care is strategically complementary
Figure 2 illustrates the case in which respective victim care are substitutes. We know ˆ j > j∗
if i ≤ i∗, for x = x∗. Consequently, again, any intersection of best response functions must lie
to the northeast of (y∗,z∗), i.e. be such that both victims choose supraoptimal care.
Consequently, we deduce from the ﬁgures that, for x = x∗, there cannot be an equilibrium
with victim care levels less than the eﬃcient levels, irrespective of victim care being substitutes
or complements. In the following, we provide a more formal argumentation for this fact. Given
x = x∗, the fact that JCSN is strictly convex in j and that care ceases to be productive for
suﬃciently large care levels assures the existence of a Nash equilibrium in victim care. In the
face of this abstract statement, it is of interest whether victim care levels in that equilibrium
can fall below the socially desired levels. We denote (ˆ y, ˆ z) as the victims’ best responses, given
x = x∗. For (ˆ y, ˆ z) << (y∗,z∗) to be the equilibrium given x = x∗, it needs to hold that a
unilateral increase of care to the socially optimal level implies higher individual costs for both
victims. Since the individual victim cost function JCSN is strictly convex given x = x∗ and a
certain i, increasing j beyond ˆ j until j∗ is attained necessarily implies an increase in the cost
10










Figure 2: Best response functions if victim care is strategically substitutionary
level if ˆ j < j∗. Expressing this fact for Y and Z, we obtain
ˆ y + p(x
∗)q





ˆ z + p(x
∗)q




∗, ˆ y)D (9)
The summation of these inequalities gives
ˆ y + ˆ z + p(x
∗)[q
Y (ˆ y, ˆ z)D + q






∗, ˆ z)D + q
Z(z
∗, ˆ y)D] (10)
We add x∗ to both sides and obtain
x
∗ + ˆ y + ˆ z + p(x
∗)[q
Y (ˆ y, ˆ z)D + q







∗, ˆ z)D + q
Z(z
∗, ˆ y)D] (11)
Note that qJ(j∗,ˆ i) < qJ(j∗,i∗) due to the assumption of qJ
i > 0 and that ˆ y as well as ˆ z are
assumed to be smaller than y∗ and z∗, respectively. Consequently, the right-hand side of the
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qZ (qY) is less than y∗ (z∗), which reduces qY (qY ). Unaﬀected by this, qY (qZ) is evaluated
using y∗ (z∗). In contrast to the right-hand side, the left-hand side of the inequality must be
larger than SC∗ because this represents an evaluation of social costs at (x∗, ˆ y, ˆ z) and otherwise
(x∗,y∗,z∗) would not be social cost-minimizing.
From this reasoning follows that the actual ordering is
x
∗ + ˆ y + ˆ z + p(x
∗)[q
Y(ˆ y, ˆ z)D + q








∗, ˆ z)D + q
Z(z
∗, ˆ y)D] (12)
which excludes an equilibrium in (ˆ y, ˆ z) << (y∗,z∗) with x = x∗.
Given that victims exert more than the socially optimal level of care in response to injurer
care being equal to due care, it needs to be tested whether the injurer takes x∗ in response to
these victim care levels. It is very well possible that the supraoptimal victim care decreases the
threat of the expected liability to such an extent that the injurer minimizes individual costs
by a care level less than due care. In consequence, to establish x = x∗ as the best response to
(ˆ y, ˆ z), we need to argue that
x
∗ < ¯ x + p(¯ x)[q
Y (ˆ y, ˆ z)D + q
Z(ˆ z, ˆ y)D] (13)
holds, where ¯ x = arg minx<x∗{x + p(x)[qY (ˆ y, ˆ z)D + qZ(ˆ z, ˆ y)D]}. This obviously is certainly
true if [qY(ˆ y, ˆ z)+qZ(ˆ z, ˆ y)] ≥ [qY (y∗,z∗)+qZ(z∗,y∗)] holds, i.e. if the total accident probability
for given x is actually increased by victim care being larger than the socially optimal levels.
The reverse case is presumably more relevant and occurs if the direct eﬀect on the accident
probability qJ of ˆ j > j∗ dominates the indirect eﬀect of ˆ i > i∗. Under these circumstances,
the inequality (13) does not necessarily hold and it is no longer certain that the injurer takes
x∗ in response to (ˆ y, ˆ z). Consequently, an ambiguity remains without further restrictions. The
injurer prefers to take standard care only if the eﬀect of suprastandard care by victims on total
expected harm is not too strong.8 Figure 3 illustrates the case in which the supraoptimal victim
care argues for taking less injurer care than is prescribed by the standard care level, i.e. depicts
the case in which (13) does not hold.
So far, we have ﬁrst looked at the victim response to x = x∗ and then whether x = x∗
is the best response to the way victims respond to x = x∗. Now, we consider what victim
8Note that, for instance, Dharmapala and Hoﬀmann (2005) assume that an analogue to (13) always holds
for ¯ x < x∗ and any (y,z).
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¯ x x∗ x
p(x)[qY (ˆ y, ˆ z) + qZ(ˆ z, ˆ y)]D
p(x)[qY (y∗,z∗) + qZ(z∗,y∗)]D
Figure 3: Injurer cost comparison
behavior results in response to x < x∗, that is if (13) does not hold. Since the ﬁrst line in (6)
is relevant in that case and will be minimized by the potential victim J, the victims’ response
to any x < x∗ is not exerting any care. If such an outcome were an equilibrium, the injurer
would bear
XC = x0 + p(x0)[q
Y (0,0)D + q
Z(0,0)D] (14)
where accordingly x0 = arg minx<x∗{x + p(x)[qY (0,0)D + qZ(0,0)D]}.













<x + y + z + p(x)[q
Y (y,z)D + q
Z(z,y)D] (15)
holds for any (x,y,z)  = (x∗,y∗,z∗) and, thus, will also hold for (x0,0,0). Consequently, injurers
prefer to deviate unilaterally to x = x∗ if (x0,0,0) is the constellation faced by the injurer. In
consequence, if (13) does not hold, then there is a circle which allows only for a mixed-strategy
equilibrium. Given x = x∗, we obtain (ˆ y, ˆ z) as best responses by Y and Z. Given (ˆ y, ˆ z) and (13)
13
13 Friehe: Victim Interdependence in the Accident Setting
Produced by bepress.com, 2011failing to hold, the injurer responds by taking x < x∗. Given x < x∗, victims do not take care.
Given (y,z) = (0,0), the injurer deviates to x = x∗ and we return to the beginning. Similar
circles will emerge below and are described in, for instance, Endres and Querner (1995).
The above allows deducing the following result.
Proposition 1 Assume that qJ
i > 0. Given simple negligence, (i) if (13) holds, the outcome
with respect to care is (x∗, ˆ y, ˆ z), where (ˆ y, ˆ z) >> (y∗,z∗), whereas (ii) if (13) does not hold, the
equilibrium is in mixed strategies where care levels diﬀerent from the socially optimal levels are
played with positive probability.
Proof. See the above.
In the setting considered in this section, victim care has an upside and a downside, since it
lowers the accident probability for the victim exerting care but also increases the probability
of being involved in an accident for other victims. The fact that the latter does not enter
the individual calculus causes a tendency of victims investing too much in care from a social
perspective. Simple negligence directs a standard at the injurer who complies (if (13) holds).
As a consequence, victims are residual risk bearers. However, they are residual risk bearers who
do not internalize all consequences ﬂowing from their choices. Consequently, simple negligence
proves unable to deal with the complexity of victims adversely aﬀecting each other by taking
care.
Negligence with a Defense of Contributory Negligence
Negligence with a defense of contributory negligence directs behavioral standards at both parties
to the accident. The injurer will be free from expected liability if either she fulﬁlls due care or
if she is negligent but excused from liability due to victim negligence. This is expressed in the
following individual cost functions. The injurer expects to bear costs according to
XCNCN =

          
          
x + p(x)D[qY (y,z) + qZ(z,y)] if x < x∗ and y ≥ y∗, z ≥ z∗
x + p(x)qY (y,z)D if x < x∗ and y ≥ y∗, z < z∗
x + p(x)qZ(z,y)D if x < x∗ and y < y∗, z ≥ z∗
x if x < x∗ and y < y∗, z < z∗ or x ≥ x∗ ∀y,z.
(16)
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j if x < x∗ and j ≥ j∗
j + p(x)qJ(j,i)D if x < x∗ and j < j∗ or x ≥ x∗ ∀y,z
(17)
The central diﬀerence between simple negligence and negligence with a defense of contribu-
tory negligence is the fact that negligent injurers are freed from expected liability if the victim
is negligent as well. Given the analysis presented for simple negligence, we may conjecture that
the eﬃcient outcome is not attainable under negligence with a defense of contributory negli-
gence either. The reasoning goes as follows. Given that injurers take due care, victims bear full
expected individual harm and therefore have excessive incentives to take care. In other terms,
having standards directed at victims, which are eﬀective only if the injurer is negligent, cannot
curtail excessive incentives. This intuition will now be supported more formally.
Proposition 2 Assume that qJ
i > 0. Given negligence with a defense of contributory negli-
gence, (i) if (13) holds, the outcome under negligence with a defense of contributory negligence
with respect to care is (x∗, ˆ y, ˆ z), where (ˆ y, ˆ z) >> (y∗,z∗), whereas (ii) if (13) does not hold, the
equilibrium is in mixed strategies where care levels diﬀerent from the socially optimal levels are
played with positive probability.
Proof. Given that x = x∗, incentives are the same as under simple negligence as long as there
are no incentives for substandard victim care. However, it can be ruled out that (ˆ y, ˆ z) are sub-
standard care levels (the argumentation undertaken for simple negligence applies analogously).
Then, x∗ is a best response to (ˆ y, ˆ z) if (13) holds, which establishes the equilibrium in (x∗, ˆ y, ˆ z).
If (13) does not hold so that X chooses x < x∗ as best response to (ˆ y, ˆ z), it is then vital how
victims will respond to this. Given that ¯ x < x∗, victim J knows that taking due care means
being free of expected harm, whereas a care level below standard care leaves expected harm
with the victim. Suppose there is an equilibrium in substandard victim care given ¯ x < x∗,
denoted (¯ x,ys,zs). In such a case, we would have to be in the position to rule out that a
unilateral deviation by victims to due care is individually desired, i.e., it needs to hold that
ys + p(¯ x)q
Y(ys,zs)D < y
∗ (18)
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∗ + ys + zs + p(¯ x)[q





This ranking is contradicted by (x∗,y∗,z∗) being the unique minimizer of SC.9
Consequently, victims would not opt for a care level less than the care standard in equi-
librium. With victims being standard-adherent if x < x∗, injurers prefer to choose due care
themselves as this minimizes individual costs which is obvious in reference to the social ﬁrst-
order condition with respect to injurer care, (2). Due care by injurers is best responded to
from the victims’ perspective by (ˆ y, ˆ z), as established above. As a consequence, in the case
that (13) does not hold, we once again obtain circular reasoning of the following sort. Given
x < x∗, victims choose to adhere to due care. Given victim due care, the injurer rather adheres
to standard care. If injurer care equals standard care, victims choose (ˆ y, ˆ z) to which the injurer
optimally responds with x < x∗.
Victims are once again destined to be residual risk bearers (if (13) holds), which cannot
lead to the eﬃcient care vector as marginal eﬀects from the social problem are missing in the
victim cost minimization. This is the same reasoning as laid out for simple negligence. The
standards directed at victims under negligence with a defense of contributory negligence have
an eﬀect if the inequality which reasons for taking due care by the injurer, (13), does not hold.
In that circumstance, victims include care levels in their mixed strategy diﬀerent from those
under simple negligence.
Strict Liability with a Defense of Contributory Negligence (SLCN)
This liability rule obliges injurers to compensate non-negligent victims, whereas victims whose
care falls short of due care obtain no transfer irrespective of injurer behavior. This implies the
following individual cost functions. Injurer costs XC can be stated as
XCSLCN =

          
          
x + p(x)[qY (y,z)D + qZ(z,y)D] if y ≥ y∗and z ≥ z∗
x + p(x)qY (y,z)D if y ≥ y∗and z < z∗
x + p(x)qZ(z,y)D if y < y∗and z ≥ z∗
x if y < y∗and z < z∗.
(21)
9The LHS is larger than the usual reference ¯ x+ys +zs +p(¯ x)[qY (ys,zs)D +qZ(zs,ys)D] due to x∗ − ¯ x > 0.
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j if j ≥ j∗
j + p(x)qJ(j,i)D if j < j∗
(22)
Suppose that victims exactly comply with care standards. Then injurers choose x∗ since
it minimizes individual costs. This follows from the ﬁrst-order condition of the social problem
with respect to injurer care, (2).
In turn, suppose that the injurer chooses x∗, then victims may either comply with due care
or take care that falls short of due care. In any case, victims will never exert more care than due
care since these alternative actions are clearly dominated by due care. This feature will prove to
be fundamental for the eﬃciency characteristics of strict liability with a defense of contributory
negligence. In eﬀect, the liability rule removes the concern for expected harm from the cost
function of victims as long as care does not fall short of due care. This removal proves suﬃcient
to attain eﬃciency in the present setting. The reason for why this proves advantageous is
that victims do not consider total social expected harm but only private expected harm, which
creates higher care incentives for the individual victim than desirable from the social point of
view. In other terms, if strict liability with a defense of contributory negligence succeeds in
inducing victims to take standard care, the injurer is the residual risk bearer who internalizes
all marginal eﬀects. Therefore, the eﬃcient outcome is attained if victims take due care.
Now, we will argue that victims indeed ﬁnd it optimal to take due care as a response to
x = x∗. Note that the cost function relevant for substandard victim care levels has been shown
to be minimized by (ˆ y, ˆ z) >> (y∗,z∗). Consequently, the option of being freed from expected
harm by complying with standard care is unambiguously better than taking any care lower
than what is required by the legal standard.
Suppose instead that x < x∗ is chosen by the injurer. This only reinforces the incentive to
comply with due care for victims as injurer care and victim care are substitutes with respect
to the accident probability πXJ. For very high x > x∗, it might become optimal for victims to
choose less than due care. However, this cannot be part of a pure-strategy equilibrium. The
injurer would adapt by taking no care, to which victims respond by deviating to standard care.
Given victim standard care, injurers optimize by taking x∗.
Proposition 3 Assume that qJ
i > 0. The outcome under strict liability with a defense of
contributory negligence with regard to care is (x∗,y∗,z∗).
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This analysis incorporates that victims aﬀect each other when taking care. We have es-
tablished that this challenges the eﬃciency properties of simple negligence and negligence with
a defense of contributory negligence. Under simple negligence, victims optimize continuously
with respect to care since injurers choose standard care. The resultant care levels diﬀer from
the eﬃcient care levels due to the missing internalization of the eﬀect victim care entails on
other victims. Negligence with a defense of contributory negligence directs standards at both
parties. However, if the injurer always complies with the standard, the eﬀects are unchanged in
comparison to simple negligence. If the injurer does not always comply, then negligence with a
defense of contributory negligence yields an outcome diﬀerent from that resultant under simple
negligence because of the standards directed at victims. Yet, under that circumstance, both
liability rules obtain an equilibrium in mixed strategies which is characterized by care levels
diﬀerent from socially optimal care being played with positive probability.
Strict liability with a defense of contributory negligence diﬀers in that there is no standard
directed at injurers. Victims can free themselves of expected harm by complying with due care.
In response, injurers optimize continuously with respect to care, which does not question the
attainability of eﬃcient care since this individual optimization takes all marginal eﬀects of care
into account. Stated alternatively, the removal of expected harm from the individual victim
cost functions, once victim due care is taken irrespective of injurer care, proves to be the critical
ingredient for the attainment of eﬃciency. This holds due to the fact that the consideration
of expected harm in the victim cost function leads them astray from the social problem as it
comprises only a part of total expected harm.
3.2 Victims Aﬀect Each Other Positively
In this section, we consider the case that care-taking by one victim lowers the accident prob-
ability of other victims, i.e. the case in which qJ
i < 0 holds. The consequence is that since
victims only take individual costs into account, taking victim care is associated with a posi-
tive externality. We will now establish how the liability rules considered perform under these
circumstances.
Simple Negligence
The individual cost functions relevant in this case are (5) and (6). The injurer avoids
expected harm by taking due care. Victims respond by taking (y+,z+) << (y∗,z∗) due to
18
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neglected in the individual optimization. This also states that there is no equilibrium in which,
given x = x∗, both victims take care above the socially optimal level. The reasoning very much
follows that from above. For (y+,z+) >> (y∗,z∗) to be the equilibrium given x = x∗, it needs
to hold that a unilateral decrease of care to the socially optimal level implies higher individual














































Now, qJ(j∗,i+) < qJ(j∗,i∗) due to the assumption of qJ
i < 0 and the assumption that (y+,z+) >>
(y∗,z∗). Consequently, the right-hand side of the above inequality is less than SC∗. In con-
trast, the left-hand side of the inequality must be larger than SC∗ because this represents an
evaluation of social costs at (x∗,y+,z+) and otherwise (x∗,y∗,z∗) would not minimize social
costs. Therefore it holds that
x
∗ + ˆ y + ˆ z + p(x
∗)[q
Y(ˆ y, ˆ z)D + q








∗, ˆ z)D + q
Z(z
∗, ˆ y)D] (25)
which excludes an equilibrium (y+,z+) >> (y∗,z∗) for x = x∗.
As in Section 3.1, the intuition for this ﬁnding can be illustrated by the use of ﬁgures
analogous to Figure 1 and 2. Figure 4 (5) depicts the case in which care by victim Y and by Z
are strategic complements (substitutes). Once again, ﬁgures comprise the best response function
and one iso-cost curve for each victim. The illustration shows that there is no intersection of
respective best response functions to the northeast of (y∗,z∗).
Given (y+,z+), the injurer chooses due care since the substandard victim care only reinforces
the incentive to comply with due care due to the fact that injurer and victim care are substitutes
with respect to the accident probability function. In fact, there is no other pure-strategy
equilibrium under simple negligence. Taking x > x∗ is dominated by taking x = x∗ and any
19
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Figure 4: Best response functions if victim care is strategically complementary
constellation with x < x∗ would also entail (y,z) = (0,0) to which the injurer always responds
by taking due care.
Note that we argued in the previous section that there cannot be an equilibrium in which
both victim care levels are less than ﬁrst-best care and injurer care is equal to ﬁrst-best care.
The above seems to be in contradiction to this assertion. However, there is a key diﬀerence due
to the reversed direction of victim care on the accident probability of other victims.
Negligence with a Defense of Contributory Negligence
The injurer avoids expected harm by taking due care. Victims respond to x = x∗ by taking
(y+,z+) << (y∗,z∗). That level of victim care as given, injurers reduce care taken to zero as
injurers only care about precaution costs in that circumstance (see (16)). Now, as it follows
from (x∗,y∗,z∗) being the unique social cost minimizing care vector that
y0 + p(0)q





cannot hold simultaneously, where y0 and z0 are cost-minimizing victim care levels given x = 0
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Figure 5: Best response functions if victim care is strategically substitutionary
with (y,z) restricted to be less than (y∗,z∗), we predict that victims divert to due care given
no injurer care. As a consequence, there is no pure-strategy equilibrium under negligence with
a defense of contributory negligence.
Strict Liability with a Defense of Contributory Negligence
The individual cost functions relevant in this case are (21) and (22). Suppose x = x∗, then
victims may either comply with due care or choose less than due care. The victim payoﬀs are
j∗ and ˜ j+p(x∗)qJ(˜ j,i∗)D for J, where ˜ j minimizes the individual cost function for j < j∗ given
x = x∗ and i = i∗. For there to be an equilibrium in (x∗,y∗,z∗), we need to assure that there
are no incentives for victim J to deviate to ˜ j given x∗ and i∗. This is not generally possible.
The fact that there is a positive externality causes the individually optimal care level given
(x∗,i∗) to be less than j∗. In cases in which the positive eﬀect on the accident probability of
others is huge, this may reason that j∗ > ˜ j + p(x∗)qJ(˜ j,i∗)D.
As stated above, Dharmapala and Hoﬀmann (2005) assume that the threat of expected
harm is always suﬃcient for the individual to ﬁnd it beneﬁcial to increase care to standard
care. Such an assumption takes the requisite
j
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Although we cannot rule out incentives for a unilateral deviation, i.e., that (28) does not
hold, we can rule out that there is an equilibrium in which both victims considered indeed
choose care below due care. In such an equilibrium, injurers choose no care and consequently
the reasoning involving (26) and (27) would apply.
Proposition 4 Assume that qJ
i < 0. Given strict liability with a defense of contributory
negligence, (i) if (28) holds, then the eﬃcient care vector is attained, whereas (ii) if (28) does
not hold, then there is no pure strategy equilibrium. Under simple negligence and negligence
with a defense of contributory negligence, the eﬃcient care vector is never attained.
Proof. See the above.
4 Conclusion
Liability rules can under many circumstances deal with the interdependency of potential injurer
and potential victim. However, since real accident contexts are very often quite complex, further
interdependencies are likely to be at work. In our framework, victims are interdependent in the
sense that care by one victim aﬀects not only the accident probability of this victim but also that
of other victims. Such an interrelation is likely to be present in many accident contexts. The
interesting case in which care by one victim increases the exposure of other victims describes
accident diversion, a phenomenon related to the diversion of crime.
This structure creates an externality, which implies that precaution choices may be ineﬃ-
cient. In the individual optimization, victims do not account for the eﬀect on total expected
harm but only for the eﬀect on individual expected liability. This can eﬀectuate that victims
are willing to surpass (exert less than) eﬃcient care in the case that victims aﬀect one another
detrimentally (positively). However, it is shown that strict liability with a defense of contrib-
utory negligence can induce optimal care. Interestingly, this holds for the case of a positive
and a negative externality. For the case of a negative externality, the reason for the eﬃcient
outcome under strict liability with a defense of contributory negligence is that the liability
rule cuts oﬀ further victim care-taking incentives once due care is achieved. For the case of
a positive externality, the eﬃcient outcome is possible under strict liability with a defense of
contributory negligence since it can incentivize victims to take due care by freeing them from
22
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The analysis explicitly considered simple negligence, negligence with a defense of contrib-
utory negligence, and strict liability with a defense of contributory negligence and points out
that the latter has the best properties when it comes to inducing eﬃcient care. Comparative
negligence directs standards at both parties and yields payoﬀs diﬀerent from those resulting for
negligence with a defense of contributory negligence only if injurer and victim choose care less
than due care. Consequently, comparative negligence cannot outperform strict liability with a
defense of contributory negligence in either of the cases considered since it lacks the features of
the latter rule highlighted at the end of the last paragraph.
This study highlights the fact that victims’ interdependence is not appropriately captured
by liability rules. The optimal behavior of victims is orchestrated with that of other victims.
The decentralization of care-taking behavior via liability rules is not successful in ensuring
this orchestration. This shortcoming may be explained by the fact that liability rules do
not consider that the concept of duty of care ideally needs to include the relationship among
victims. For instance, if victim care lowers the accident probability of other victims, care ought
to be higher from a social perspective than from the individual victim’s stance due to victim
interdependence. If a given victim takes individually optimal care which is less than socially
optimal care, liability law oﬀers other victims who are aﬀected by the care of the given victim
no means to correct incentives.
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